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TIME OVER MATTER: MEASURING THE
REASONABLENESS OF OFFICER CONDUCT IN
§ 1983 CLAIMS
Evelyn Michalos*
In the United States, far more police encounters result in civilian and
officer deaths than in other democratic countries. When a government actor
uses excessive force against an individual during an arrest or investigatory
stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
seizure, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a federal civil remedy for that individual.
In Graham v. Connor and Tennessee v. Garner, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that courts should assess the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force
to seize an individual in light of the “totality of the circumstances,” which
includes the severity of the crime, whether the suspect actively resisted arrest,
and whether the suspect posed a threat to the officers and bystanders.
However, the Court has never delineated how lower courts should assess the
totality of the circumstances in excessive force claims under § 1983. Thus,
circuit courts have applied varying methods to analyze law enforcement’s
use of force.
This Note examines whether the Second Circuit’s narrow approach, the
Third Circuit’s broad approach, or the Seventh Circuit’s segmented
approach properly identifies the circumstances to consider when measuring
the reasonableness of officers’ uses of force during a seizure in § 1983
claims. This Note compares the three circuit court approaches to how
Canadian courts evaluate the reasonableness of police conduct in excessive
force claims.
Ultimately, this Note concludes that the Third Circuit’s approach, which
considers causally relevant conduct, such as preseizure conduct, is truest to
the notion of “totality” and should be the uniform method. As illustrated by
Canadian courts, this Note argues that the Third Circuit standard
incorporates de-escalation training as a factor in the reasonableness
analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
On Saturday, April 15, 2017, two Fresno County, California, police
officers shot and killed Isiah Murrietta-Golding, a sixteen-year-old who had
fled to avoid arrest.1 Isiah’s mother brought a civil rights action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against the officers for excessive use of force,2 arguing that
the deadly use of force constituted an unreasonable seizure.3 Isiah’s mother
asserted that, while investigating a homicide that had occurred the day before,
a tactical police unit in plain clothes waited outside the home of those
suspected of the crime.4 When Isiah and his three friends drove away from
the home, the officers initiated a traffic stop and told the boys to exit their
vehicle.5 Isiah’s mother alleged the officers had no arrest warrant and no
search warrant.6 She further contended that the officers ordered the teens to
walk backward toward the officers with their hands raised while they held
the teens at gunpoint.7 According to the plaintiff, Isiah was small: he
weighed 109 pounds and was five feet four inches tall.8 Isiah ran and the
officers pursued on foot.9 When one of the officers saw Isiah jump over the
fence of an empty day care and reach for his waistband, the officer shot Isiah
in the back of the head.10
In the United States, individuals are killed during police encounters far
more often than in other democratic countries.11 England and Wales saw
roughly fifty-five fatal civilian shootings by police in twenty-four years,
whereas the United States saw fifty-nine in the first twenty-four days of
1. See Kristin Lam, A California Police Officer Fatally Shot a 16-Year-Old Boy in Newly
Released 2017 Video, USA TODAY (Oct. 25, 2019, 1:24 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/nation/2019/10/23/isiah-murrietta-golding-california-police-shooting-debate2017-video/2452447001/ [https://perma.cc/49LW-U497].
2. Complaint for Damages, Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, and Demand for Jury Trial
at 2, Murrietta-Golding v. City of Fresno, No. 18-CV-0314 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2018).
3. Id. at 9–10.
4. Id. at 6.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Lam, supra note 1.
10. Id.
11. Jamiles Lartey, By the Numbers: US Police Kill More in Days than Other Countries
Do in Years, GUARDIAN (June 9, 2015, 6:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/jun/09/the-counted-police-killings-us-vs-other-countries [https://perma.cc/F9FSB6JF]. See generally Christopher Ingraham, Police Shootings Are a Leading Cause of Death
for Young American Men, New Research Shows, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2019, 7:14 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/08/police-shootings-are-leading-causedeath-young-american-men-new-research-shows/ [https://perma.cc/PD6T-4ZTN].
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2015.12 In 2019, officers fatally shot 999 persons, over 400 of whom were
people of color.13 In addition, approximately 214 of the 999 people killed
had mental illnesses.14 Police use of force is the sixth leading cause of death
for men ages twenty-five to twenty-nine,15 ranking even higher as a cause of
death for Black men in this age group.16 From January 2020 to August 2020,
28 percent of people killed by police were Black, even though only 13
percent of the U.S. population is Black.17 Data on unarmed victims of police
use of force display an even starker disparity in fatal encounters for racial
minorities.18 In 2015, people of color comprised 37.4 percent of the
population but 62.7 percent of unarmed victims of police use of force.19
From 2013 to 2020, 17 percent of the total unarmed victims were Black, 14.5
percent were Hispanic, and 13 percent were white.20
Individuals harmed by officers’ excessive force, deadly or nondeadly, can
sue in a civil rights action pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 187121 (also
known as the Ku Klux Klan Act), more commonly known as a § 1983
claim.22 Section 1983 claims provide plaintiffs with a federal remedy when
a defendant-officer has violated their constitutional rights while acting under
color of law.23 Consequently, when officers violate an individual’s Fourth
12. Lartey, supra note 11. A 2015 Bureau of Justice Statistics study on contacts between
the police and the public found that the number of encounters with police involving people
who were sixteen or older declined from 26 percent to 21 percent between 2011 and 2015.
ELIZABETH DAVIS ET AL., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE
PUBLIC, 2015, at 1 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp15.pdf [https://perma.cc/
UF7P-E6YA]. However, from January 2013 to December 2019, police departments in the
nation’s one hundred largest cities were responsible for 26 percent of deaths resulting from
encounters with police. Those police departments killed four times as many unarmed Black
civilians as unarmed white civilians. Police Accountability Tool, MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE,
https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/cities [https://perma.cc/4GYE-QUXZ] (last visited Nov. 3,
2020). Black, Native American, and Hispanic persons face a higher risk of being killed by
police than white persons. Frank Edwards et al., Risk of Being Killed by Police Use of Force
in the United States by Age, Race-Ethnicity, and Sex, 116 PNAS 16,793, 16,793 (2019).
13. Julie Tate et al., Fatal Force, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
graphics/2019/national/police-shootings-2019/ [https://perma.cc/4VWW-KSHQ] (last visited
Nov. 3, 2020).
14. Id.
15. See Ingraham, supra note 11. See generally Edwards et al., supra note 12.
16. See Police Violence Map, MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE, https://mappingpolice
violence.org [https://perma.cc/GBY8-P9DQ] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
17. Id.
18. See Jon Swaine et al., Black Americans Killed by Police Twice as Likely to Be
Unarmed as White People, GUARDIAN (June 1, 2015, 8:38 AM), https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/01/black-americans-killed-by-police-analysis
[https://perma.cc/7HMT-5U3Q].
19. Id.
20. Police Violence Map, supra note 16.
21. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18 and 42 U.S.C).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Jeremy R. Lacks, Note, The Lone American Dictatorship:
How Court Doctrine and Police Culture Limit Judicial Oversight of the Police Use of Deadly
Force, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 391, 392 (2008).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken
‘under color of’ state law.” Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961) (quoting United States
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Amendment right against unreasonable seizure by using unreasonable force
in light of the “totality of the circumstances,” the individual may bring a
§ 1983 claim against the officer.24 However, circuit courts are divided on
whether “totality of the circumstances” should include preseizure conduct,25
officers’ conduct only at the moment of seizure,26 or a segmented time
frame.27
Canadian excessive force cases provide a useful comparison to the
different approaches circuit courts have taken in the United States. Canada
is the most useful comparison because of its geographic proximity to the
United States, its Charter of Rights and Freedoms—which grants a guarantee
against unreasonable seizure similar to the Fourth Amendment—and its rule
authorizing police to employ lethal force only when they reasonably believe
suspects pose an imminent threat of serious injury or death to officers or
others.28 In addition, the Criminal Code of Canada prescribes factors courts
must consider in excessive force cases that are similar to the Graham v.
Connor29 factors laid out by the U.S. Supreme Court.30 Like the Third
Circuit, Canadian courts review relevant context to determine the
reasonableness of officers’ actions in excessive force claims.31 Canadian
courts also review officers’ preseizure conduct and consider, among other
factors, whether police attempted to de-escalate the situation.32
This Note recommends federal courts use a standardized view of totality
of the circumstances that properly assesses the reasonableness of officers’
use of force when arresting, stopping, or otherwise seizing civilians.
Ultimately, this Note concludes that the Third Circuit uses the most effective
standard: totality of the circumstances should include causally relevant
preseizure conduct regarding an officer’s use of force and should incorporate
insights from Canadian law.
Part I of this Note describes the historical and legal context of § 1983
claims vis-à-vis the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Part II examines the Second, Third, and Seventh
Circuits’ differing analyses of the totality of the circumstances and outlines
various legal and policy arguments for each view. It then compares the U.S.
circuit courts’ approaches to Canadian courts’ views and explores the
differences. Part III concludes that the Third Circuit’s method is truest to the
notion of “totality,” as it (1) includes police actions leading up to the seizure
v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989); Tennessee
v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).
25. See Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 291 (3d Cir. 1999).
26. See Salim v. Proulx, 93 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 1996).
27. See Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1994).
28. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).
29. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
30. See infra Part II.B.2.
31. See infra Part II.B.1.
32. See infra Part II.B.1.
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that are causally relevant to the force later used, (2) provides a fair
mechanism by which both plaintiffs’ and defendants’ perspectives may be
heard, and (3) allows courts to consider accepted police practices,
particularly de-escalation, in the reasonableness analysis.33
I. USE OF FORCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDARD
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs can bring claims against officers for
violating their constitutional rights while acting under color of law.34
Congress enacted this statute to enforce liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.35
Part I.A provides an overview of § 1983 and its history, the risks involved
when officers utilize deadly force, and the disproportionate impact of police
violence on people of color and those with mental illnesses. Part I.B briefly
describes the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures.
Finally, Part I.C reviews two key excessive force cases in which the Supreme
Court interpreted and refined the Fourth Amendment totality of the
circumstances standard in the § 1983 context.
A. Excessive Force Under § 1983: Risks of the Use of Deadly Force and
Disproportionate Impacts
Congress enacted § 1983 as section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act,36 one of
the Reconstruction civil rights acts, to enforce Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures.37 Section 1983
applies to government actors (including both state and local officials), private
parties acting under state authorization, and some private parties acting
alone.38 Under the common law, police could use lethal force in self-defense
or to stop fleeing felons,39 which allowed states to exercise their police
powers without federal intrusion.40 However, under § 1983, any person
acting “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage”
of any state, territory, or the District of Columbia, who deprives people of
their constitutional or federal rights could be subject to civil liability.41 Thus,
§ 1983 provides a civil action to protect individuals against the misuse of
state power.42
33. See infra Part III.A.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
35. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423 (1973).
36. ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
37. See Carter, 409 U.S. at 423; see also CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 335 (1871).
38. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978) (finding a policy of
the New York City Department of Social Services and Board of Education that forced
pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence unconstitutional in a § 1983 suit brought
by a female).
39. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *131, *132–33 (stating that public justice
homicide occurs when an officer kills an assaulter or “attempts to take a man charged with
felony, and is resisted; and, in the endeavour to take him, kills him”).
40. Lacks, supra note 22, at 399.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
42. See id.
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1. Protecting Civil Liberties
Plaintiffs bringing § 1983 claims must prove two essential elements: (1)
a person acted under color of state, territory, or District of Columbia law; and
(2) the person’s actions deprived the plaintiff of “rights, privileges, or
immunities” guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution or federal law.43 The term
“person” includes police, cities, mayors, departments of social services, and
school boards.44
Congress enacted § 1983 to ensure principles of civil freedom and justice,
thereby guaranteeing constitutional rights such as life and property.45
Congress passed the Ku Klux Klan Act, also known as “the third force bill,”
with the Ku Klux Klan’s lawless and brutal behavior in mind, among other
unlawful activities in the Southern states.46 The statute sought to address
state actors’ failure to give citizens equal protection of the law, either due to
inability or unwillingness to do so.47 Representative George Hoar
highlighted the statute’s purpose “to insure that under no temptation of party
spirit, under no political excitement, under no jealousy of race or caste, will
the majority either in numbers or strength in any State seek to deprive the
remainder of the population of their civil rights.”48
From 1871 to 1920, federal courts decided only twenty-one § 1983 claims,
nine of which reached the Supreme Court.49 In 1961, in Monroe v. Pape,50
the Court reinvigorated § 1983 claims by making police officers civilly liable
for illegal acts committed without state authorization.51 In Monroe, thirteen
officers forced the plaintiff and his wife to stand naked in their living room
while police searched their apartment until they were later arrested without a
warrant.52 The Court held that the officers’ warrantless and unreasonable
search and seizure constituted action under color of law cognizable under
§ 1983.53 The Court further expanded § 1983’s scope in Monell v.
Department of Social Services,54 holding that the statute also covers
municipalities and other local government units whose customs, policies, or

43. See id.
44. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978).
45. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 182–83 (1961), overruled on other grounds by
Monell, 436 U.S. 658.
46. See id. at 174. In debates over the Act, congressmen constantly referred to an over600-page joint select committee report investigating conditions in the South. The report
detailed testimonies on the Klan’s raids, murders, and other violent acts and described the state
governments’ weak responses. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 150 (1871); see also
H.R. REP. NO. 42-22, pt. 1, at 2–3 (1872).
47. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 176.
48. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 335.
49. See The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil Remedy?, 26 IND.
L.J. 361, 363–66 (1951) (stating that federal courts rarely adjudicated § 1983 claims before
1920).
50. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell, 436 U.S. 658.
51. Id. at 187.
52. Id. at 169.
53. Id. at 187.
54. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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practices deprive individuals of their constitutional or federal rights.55 The
next section examines the effect of such deprivation.
2. The Dangers and Disparate Effects of Utilizing Force
Excessive force, especially deadly force, raises serious human rights
concerns, including the rights to life, security of one’s person, freedom from
discrimination, and equal protection under the law.56 Because law
enforcement officers undertake to protect, serve, and respect human life
while promoting public safety through lawful means,57 communities largely
rely on officers’ responsiveness and professional judgment when officers
engage with the public.58 However, Amnesty International has argued that
the frequency of shootings by police shows that lethal force
disproportionately affects certain persons, including different social groups,
based on age, gender, and race.59 Disparities may be exacerbated by previous
federal law not requiring police departments to report lethal encounters.60
Another study found that police are more likely to use deadly force against
Black individuals, Native American individuals, and Hispanic men and
suggested that the risk of death is highest for Black men.61 On average, Black
men have a one in one thousand chance of being killed by police as compared
to a one in 2000 chance for men overall, and a one in 33,000 chance for
women.62 Individuals of all ethnic groups face the highest risk of being killed
by police between the ages of twenty and thirty-five.63 And geographical
differences amplify racial inequity.64
In addition, police frequently encounter people with mental disabilities.65
Officers may arrest people for crimes or take them to health facilities after

55. See id. at 694.
56. AMNESTY INT’L, DEADLY FORCE: POLICE USE OF LETHAL FORCE IN THE UNITED
STATES 1 (2015), https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/aiusa_deadlyforcereportjune2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LMG6-Y6WS].
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 10.
60. See Gretchen Frazee, Deadly Police Shootings Keep Happening. Data Could Be a
Missing Piece, PBS (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/deadly-policeshootings-keep-happening-data-could-be-a-missing-piece [https://perma.cc/G453-RBNL]. A
retired Salt Lake City, Utah, police officer and vice president of the Center for Policing Equity
observed: “[Police departments] can tell me how many cars are stolen, but they can’t tell you
how many people they killed?” Id.
61. Edwards et al., supra note 12, at 16,793.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Police Violence Map, supra note 16. For example, in 2013, Buffalo, New York,
had a population of 258,959, 50 percent of residents were nonwhite, and the violent crime rate
was twelve murders per one thousand residents. Orlando, Florida, had a population of 255,483
in 2013, 42 percent of residents were nonwhite, and the violent crime rate was nine murders
per one thousand residents. Despite the lower crime rate, Orlando police fatally shot and killed
thirteen people from 2013 to 2016, whereas Buffalo police killed no one. Id.
65. See Serving Safely: The National Initiative to Enhance Policing for Persons with
Mental Illnesses and Developmental Disabilities, VERA INST. OF JUST. 1 (Feb. 2019), https://
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observing worrying behavior.66 However, encounters can escalate.67 From
January to August 2019, at least 20 percent of individuals fatally shot by
police had mental health concerns.68
3. Police Deaths in the Line of Duty
The Washington Post database suggests police shot and killed 999 people
in 2019.69 According to the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial
Fund, in that same year, 128 police officers died in the line of duty.70 The
median age was forty-three.71 In the first half of 2020, twenty-seven police
officers were shot and killed in the line of duty.72 Although police deaths in
the line of duty decreased in the first half of 2020 by 14 percent as compared
to the first half of 2019,73 the number of annual police fatalities has not been
below one hundred since 1944.74
Accordingly, when to use deadly force constitutes one of law
enforcement’s most difficult and potentially irreversible decisions.75 In
Graham, the Supreme Court recognized an officer’s need for split-second
decision-making.76 Studies have found that the high rate of civilian deaths
by police in the United States is partly due to the nation’s high crime and
individual gun ownership rates, which often create tense situations in which

www.vera.org/downloads/publications/serving-safely-fact-sheet-policing-mental-illnessdisabilities.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7U4-B8TQ].
66. See Michael Avery, Unreasonable Seizures of Unreasonable People: Defining the
Totality of Circumstances Relevant to Assessing the Police Use of Force Against Emotionally
Disturbed People, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 264 (2003).
67. See id. at 264–65.
68. See Ingraham, supra note 11.
69. See Tate et al., supra note 13.
70. 128 Law Enforcement Officer Fatalities Nationwide in 2019, NAT’L L. ENF’T
OFFICERS MEM’L FUND, https://nleomf.org/newsroom/news-releases/128-law-enforcementofficer-fatalities-nationwide-in-2019 [https://perma.cc/D57M-GBJC] (last visited Nov. 3,
2020). Of those deaths, forty-nine were gun-related, which was 6 percent less than in 2018.
See id.
71. Id.
72. See NAT’L L. ENF’T OFFICERS MEM’L FUND, 2020 MID-YEAR PRELIMINARY LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS FATALITIES REPORT 4 (2020), https://nleomf.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/08/2020-Mid-Year-Fatality-Report_v6_8_3_20_opt.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/VA5C-2FHK].
73. See id.
74. See 128 Law Enforcement Officer Fatalities Nationwide in 2019, supra note 70.
75. William A. Geller & Kevin J. Karales, Shootings of and by Chicago Police:
Uncommon Crises (pt. 2), 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 331, 371 (1982).
76. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989). Officers may be immune from
personal liability if they reasonably but mistakenly believed the law permitted their use of
force under the circumstances. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified
immunity protects police from liability, as well as harassment and distraction from
unsubstantiated claims, when officers perform reasonably in the course of their duties. Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
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officers fear for their lives.77 In 2019, over half of individuals shot and killed
by police were armed.78
While international standards require officers to de-escalate situations and
exhaust all other reasonable alternatives before using lethal force, the U.S.
constitutional standard does not require police to use the least intrusive means
to seize individuals.79 The Fourth Amendment permits officers to use any
reasonable means under the totality of the circumstances when seizing a
person.80
B. Unreasonable Seizures Under the Fourth Amendment
The Framers’ immediate concerns when drafting the Fourth Amendment
were general warrants and writs of assistance, which gave officials
unrestrained power to search and seize people and property at will.81 Such
sweeping searches and seizures offended colonists largely because they were
conducted “without any evidentiary basis.”82
In response, the Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.”83 It holds government officials accountable by
requiring them to conduct seizures reasonably and pursuant to valid
warrants.84 However, officials may, among other exceptions, temporarily
seize people without a warrant to conduct a brief investigatory stop if they
have “reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts”85 that
“criminal activity is afoot.”86 This objective standard requires more than
guesswork but less than probable cause.87 One must consider the seizure’s
circumstances as a whole, and the seizure must be based on particularized
facts.88
77. See Brendan O’Flaherty & Rajiv Sethi, How Fear Contributes to Cops’ Use of Deadly
Force, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (May 1, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://
www.themarshallproject.org/2019/05/01/can-understanding-fear-mitigate-police-violence
[https://perma.cc/5XSY-A6HK].
78. See Ingraham, supra note 11.
79. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 556–57 (1976); see also Avery, supra note 66, at 298. But see Use of Force:
Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy, NJ.GOV (June 2000), https://www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/
agguide/useofforce2001.pdf [https://perma.cc/5A8D-Q7EB] (noting New Jersey’s policy that
officers should try all other reasonable means before using force).
80. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7–9 (1985); see also Graham, 490 U.S. at 394–
96.
81. See Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 82 (1988); see also Laura K. Donohue, The Original
Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1242–44 (2016).
82. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 81, at 82; Claire Abrahamson, Note, Guilt
by Genetic Association: The Fourth Amendment and the Search of Private Genetic Databases
by Law Enforcement, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2539, 2555 (2019).
83. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
84. Id.
85. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985).
86. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
87. See id. at 22.
88. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).
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Police stopping a pedestrian on the street may constitute a “seizure.”89
However, not all encounters between police and civilians are seizures.90 For
a seizure to occur, a government actor must restrict a person’s liberty by
physical force or a show of authority to which the person submits.91 Officers
show authority when, under the totality of the circumstances, reasonable
persons would not feel “free to leave.”92 This is an objective standard.93
In Michigan v. Chesternut,94 the Supreme Court identified some police
actions that may constitute a seizure.95 These included activating sirens,
commanding a person to halt, displaying weapons, or aggressively driving to
restrain a person’s movement.96 In Chesternut, the Court found that four
officers did not sufficiently assert authority when they briefly accelerated
their cruiser and drove around a corner to drive alongside a fleeing
pedestrian.97
When determining the objective reasonableness of a seizure, courts
examine the officer’s conduct in light of the totality of the circumstances.98
This analysis must be done from the perspective of a reasonable officer on
the scene, rather than using hindsight.99 Because the reasonableness standard
is objective, courts do not consider officers’ subjective beliefs, or even ill
intentions, to determine whether their use of force was reasonable.100
C. The Fourth Amendment in Use of Force Cases: Garner & Graham
To prevail in excessive force claims under § 1983, plaintiffs must prove
that an officer’s conduct constituted a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.101 The Supreme Court has adjudicated two major excessive
force cases: Tennessee v. Garner102 and Graham.
In Garner, an officer investigating an alleged nighttime burglary saw
someone scaling the backyard fence, ordered him to stop, and shot him in the
head when he did not.103 The defendant-officer had killed an eighth grader
who had stolen ten dollars and a purse from an unoccupied house.104 The
defendant admitted that he fired to prevent escape and reasonably believed
the teenager was unarmed.105 The Court held that using deadly force
89. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
90. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552 (1980).
91. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625–26 (1991).
92. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
93. Id.
94. 486 U.S. 567 (1988).
95. Id. at 575.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 575–76.
98. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985).
99. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
100. Id. at 397; see also Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 756 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that
officers’ intentions and motivations are irrelevant to the reasonableness inquiry).
101. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 7; see also Graham, 490 U.S. at 394.
102. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
103. Id. at 3–4.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 3.
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constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness
standard106—and the Fourth Amendment does not require police to exhaust
every alternative before turning to lethal force.107 Nonetheless, the Court
struck down the Tennessee statute at issue as unconstitutional because it
authorized deadly force against any fleeing felon.108
Under Garner, deadly force is reasonable only when necessary to prevent
escape or when officers have probable cause to believe that the suspect
significantly threatens serious bodily injury or death to officers or others.109
After weighing the government’s law enforcement interests against the
teenager’s interest in life, the Court declared it better for some felony
suspects to escape than for any to die.110
In Graham, the Court expanded Garner’s holding to the use of nondeadly
force.111 The plaintiff, Dethorne Graham, was diabetic and went with his
friend Berry to a convenience store to buy orange juice to counteract an
insulin reaction.112 Seeing the long checkout line, Graham left the store and
asked Berry to drive him elsewhere.113 The defendant, Officer Connor,
became suspicious when he saw Graham leave the store quickly and initiated
an investigative stop. Officer Connor told Graham to wait until the officer
confirmed if anything had happened at the store, despite Graham’s
explanation that he was diabetic.114 When Officer Connor called for backup,
Graham exited Berry’s car, ran around it, sat down on the curb, and passed
out.115 When other officers arrived, they handcuffed Graham on the sidewalk
and lifted him onto the hood of Berry’s car.116 Graham regained
consciousness and asked the officers to check for a diabetic decal in his
wallet, but the officers told him to “shut up” and threw him into the police
car.117 The officers also prevented Graham from drinking orange juice that
a friend had brought during the encounter.118 The officers only released
Graham once they discovered he had done nothing wrong.119 As a result of
the incident, Graham sustained a broken foot, bruised forehead, and an
injured shoulder, among other injuries.120 The Court held that all excessive
force claims arising from an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure should
be analyzed under the objective reasonableness standard of the Fourth
106. Id. at 2.
107. See id. at 11–12, 20–21; Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003); Plakas
v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1148–49 (7th Cir. 1994).
108. Garner, 471 U.S. at 3. At that time, the law in many states permitted the use of force
against any fleeing felon. Id. at 12–13.
109. Id. at 3.
110. Id. at 11.
111. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
112. Id. at 388.
113. Id. at 388–89.
114. Id. at 389.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 390.
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Amendment.121 Therefore, when police use unreasonable deadly or
nondeadly force in an arrest or investigatory stop, the use of undue force
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.122
Claims of police misconduct may also be brought under other
constitutional provisions, such as the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses.123 However, because excessive force involves
government intrusion on individuals that the Fourth Amendment explicitly
prohibits, excessive force claims are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment
objective reasonableness standard, rather than as substantive due process
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.124 Accordingly, plaintiffs must
show that the force an officer employed was objectively unreasonable in light
of the totality of the circumstances.125
Although the reasonableness test has no precise definition or
application,126 the Court, in Garner, had explained that to examine the
reasonableness of an officer’s conduct, courts must balance the governmental
interests behind the intrusion against the individual’s privacy interests.127 To
balance these two interests, Graham identified three main factors to consider:
(1) the nature and severity of the crime that led to the arrest or investigatory
stop, (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the officers or
others, and (3) whether the suspect actively resisted or fled to avoid arrest.128
Graham gave courts discretion to carefully consider the particular facts
and circumstances of each case.129 Graham emphasized that officers often
face dangerous and unpredictable situations that may require split-second
decisions.130 Circuit courts have applied these factors in § 1983 cases
involving various types of force, such as the use of choke holds131 or
tasers.132

121. Id. at 394–95.
122. See id. at 394; Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).
123. See generally Wayne C. Beyer, Police Misconduct: Claims and Defenses Under the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, 30 URB. LAW. 65 (1998).
124. Graham, 490 U.S. at 388. In his concurrence, Justice Harry Blackmun asserted that
Garner did not foreclose the use of substantive due process analysis as an alternative to Fourth
Amendment analysis in pre-arrest excessive force claims. Id. at 399–400 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
125. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 21.
126. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
127. See Garner 471 U.S. at 8 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
128. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 397.
131. See, e.g., Werner v. City of Poulsbo, 548 F. App’x 381, 382 (9th Cir. 2013) (analyzing
a § 1983 claim for an officer’s use of a choke hold that caused the plaintiff to have breathing
difficulties); Barnard v. Theobald, 721 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2013) (denying immunity
for an officer’s use of a choke hold during arrest that resulted in five collapsed vertebrae in
the suspect’s spine).
132. See, e.g., Frederick v. Motsinger, 873 F.3d 641, 647 (8th Cir. 2017) (finding that tasing
a suspect who was threatening officers and store customers with a four-inch knife was
reasonable); Orr v. Copeland, 844 F.3d 484, 493 (5th Cir. 2016) (finding that using a stun gun
on a fleeing person suspected of serious drug crimes was not excessive); Yates v. Terry, 817
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Yet, the Graham factors did not delineate at what point before a seizure a
plaintiff’s or officer’s preseizure conduct should be considered.133 Thus,
Graham and Garner did not provide a particular time line for the totality of
the circumstances.134 The next part analyzes three circuits’ methods of
assessing the totality of the circumstances in light of Garner and Graham.
II. THE DIFFERENT TOTALITY TESTS
Because the Supreme Court has not provided a conclusive test for which
temporal circumstances to include when determining the reasonableness of
officers’ actions, the lower federal courts have developed differing tests,
some narrow and some more inclusive. Part II.A analyzes the Second
Circuit, Third Circuit, and Seventh Circuit jurisprudence, commentators’
views, and policy considerations. Part II.A.1 examines the Third Circuit’s
broad causation framework, which includes relevant preseizure conduct as
part of the totality of the circumstances. Part II.A.2 examines the Second
Circuit’s narrow framework, which focuses on the moment seizure occurs.
Part II.A.3 examines the Seventh Circuit’s segmented framework. Finally,
Part II.B evaluates Canadian jurisprudence by discussing the “reasonable
grounds” standard for officers to employ nondeadly or deadly force and
factors Canadian courts use to analyze whether the use of force was justified.
Part II.B then highlights circumstances Canadian courts consider in
evaluating excessive force claims as they align with or differ from the
Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits.
A. U.S. Circuit Courts: Relevant Circumstances in Assessing
Reasonableness
The circuit courts all consider plaintiffs’ preseizure actions as part of the
totality of the circumstances because a suspect’s actions are relevant to an
officer’s subsequent decisions and use of force.135 Only a few of the circuits,
however, consider officers’ preseizure actions as part of the totality of the
circumstances and, therefore, relevant to the reasonableness analysis.136

F.3d 877, 885–86 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding that tasing a suspect, who did not resist arrest, three
times was unreasonable).
133. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
134. See Avery, supra note 66, at 265.
135. See, e.g., Hensley ex rel. North Carolina v. Price, 876 F.3d 573, 582 (4th Cir. 2017)
(noting that the plaintiff emerged from a house with a gun, hit an officer, and advanced toward
other officers), cert. denied sub nom., Price v. Hensley, 138 S. Ct. 1595 (2018); Zion v.
Nassan, 556 F. App’x 103, 109 (3d Cir. 2014) (assessing whether the suspect colliding with a
parked car and driving away at a slow speed put officers or others in significant danger); Plakas
v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1994) (considering the suspect’s decision to avoid
arrest and charge at officers with a fireplace poker).
136. See Hensley, 876 F.3d at 582 (assessing the circumstances, focusing on the suspect’s
actions immediately prior to and at the moment deputies killed the suspect); Zion, 556 F.
App’x at 107 (analyzing causally relevant actions by both the plaintiffs and the defendants,
where the officers followed the suspect despite orders to discontinue pursuit and fired at the
suspect when he drove forward at a slow speed); Plakas, 19 F.3d at 1150 (dividing relevant
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1. The Third Circuit’s Broad Approach
In Abraham v. Raso,137 the Third Circuit held that the reasonableness
inquiry requires courts to consider relevant events and officer conduct
leading up to the moment officers seize someone.138 When analyzing the
totality of the circumstances in excessive force claims, the First, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits follow this interpretation to consider context and causes
before a seizure occurred.139 However, the circuit courts following the Third
Circuit’s framework acknowledge that not all factors may be equally
relevant.140 One must examine preseizure conduct in terms of its causal
relevance to the use of force.141
a. An Inclusive Time Line of Totality of the Circumstances: Causally
Relevant Conduct
In Abraham, the decedent Robert Abraham stole clothes from a Macy’s
store.142 Officer Kimberly Raso, an off-duty police officer working as a
security guard, followed Abraham to his parked car.143 When Abraham
entered his car, Raso told him to stop, but Abraham backed his car out and
hit another car.144 When he began driving forward, Raso shot toward
Abraham’s car.145 Shattering the driver’s side window, Raso’s bullet struck
Abraham’s left arm and passed into his chest.146 Abraham was pronounced
dead on arrival at a nearby hospital.147
Reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Raso,
the Third Circuit emphasized that Garner made it unreasonable for police to
employ deadly force against fleeing felons who did not pose a significant
threat to officers or bystanders.148 Here, the evidence suggested that Raso
did not stand in front of Abraham’s car and, if Raso had, a jury could
time frames and analyzing the reasonableness of an officer’s responses to the plaintiff’s
actions in each).
137. 183 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 1999).
138. Id. at 291–92.
139. See Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1189 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that provocation
that may constitute a constitutional violation should be analyzed separately, although “an
officer [who] intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent confrontation, if the provocation
is an independent Fourth Amendment violation . . . may be held liable for his otherwise
defensive use of deadly force”), abrogated by County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct.
1539 (2017); Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1132 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that, in some
cases, courts should consider police conduct that created the need to use lethal force); St.
Hilaire v. City of Laconia, 71 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that the court should consider
police actions leading up to a shooting in assessing the seizure’s reasonableness); see also
Avery, supra note 66, at 282.
140. See Abraham, 183 F.3d at 292.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 283.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 284–85.
145. Id. at 285.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 286.
148. Id. at 288.
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reasonably have found that Raso moved safely out of the way before shooting
Abraham.149
Abraham rejected a narrow interpretation of Supreme Court case law that
held that actions before the exact moment a seizure occurred cannot be
considered in the totality of the circumstances analysis.150 The Third Circuit
found the narrow approach too rigid, stating that it would lead to absurd
results; for instance, because seizure technically occurs the moment the bullet
hits the plaintiff, this narrow rule would exclude the moment the officer
pulled the trigger.151
Whereas in Garner and Graham, the Supreme Court focused on the
recognition of split-second decision-making in tense situations, the Third
Circuit’s decision in Abraham focused on the totality language and took a
broader approach.152 The Third Circuit emphasized that the three Graham
factors do not exclude other factors, including officers’ preseizure
conduct.153 Other factors may include: (1) the type of force used, (2) the
context in which police used that force, (3) the extent of the injury inflicted,
(4) whether the person was armed, (5) whether the person was sober,154 (6)
whether the person interfered or attempted to interfere in officers’ execution
of their duties, and (7) the number of arrestees or officers involved.155 For
example, if a person possesses a firearm, flees, or commits a felony, officers
reasonably can use greater force in seizing that individual as compared to an
unarmed person who stops when ordered to do so.156
b. Arguments for the Third Circuit’s Framework: True Totality and
Fairness to Both Parties
Some commentators view the Third Circuit’s approach as truest to the
totality language established by Graham and Garner, while sufficiently
providing limits to the relevant time line.157 The Third Circuit’s framework
requires courts to consider only causally relevant preseizure conduct that has
a bearing on the police’s use of force that effectively seized the individual.158
Professor Cynthia Lee asserted that what officers do or fail to do “that
increased the risk of a deadly confrontation” is merely part of the totality of
149. Id. at 294.
150. Id. at 291 (rejecting a narrow interpretation of Hodari D. that suggests a person is not
seized until the bullet actually strikes).
151. Id.
152. See id. at 292.
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Loharsingh v. City of San Francisco, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1103 (N.D. Cal.
2010).
155. See Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1170 (11th Cir. 2000); Sharrar v. Felsing, 128
F.3d 810, 822 (3d Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199
(3d Cir. 2007); Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1440 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994).
156. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
157. See, e.g., Aaron Kimber, Note, Righteous Shooting, Unreasonable Seizure?: The
Relevance of an Officer’s Pre-seizure Conduct in an Excessive Force Claim, 13 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 651, 676 (2004); see also Avery, supra note 66, at 287.
158. Abraham, 183 F.3d at 292.
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the circumstances that fact finders must consider, and the reasonableness
standard is purposely broad to include all relevant facts.159 Professor Lee
noted that, in the context of de-escalation training, police chiefs and others
are increasingly recognizing the importance of officers’ decisions leading up
to the moment they use force.160
In his Note, Aaron Kimber highlighted the notion in Abraham that
“‘totality’ is an encompassing word,”161 which considers both suspects’ and
officers’ actions as pertinent information for the reasonableness test.162
According to Kimber, by using an inclusive time line, courts more accurately
understand suspects’ actions in response to officers’ actions, and vice versa,
leading up to the moment officers exerted force.163
Another scholar asserted Graham explicitly identified the severity of the
crime as a factor courts must consider and, therefore, supports the Third
Circuit’s consideration of causally relevant conduct because a crime’s
severity requires courts to contextualize the interaction beyond the moment
the seizure occurred.164 The crime also helps courts understand officers’
initial tactics and civilians’ responses in the chain of events leading to the
choice to exercise force.165
Scholars favoring the Third Circuit’s causal approach contend it most
closely reaches a practical bright-line rule courts can use in deciding which
factors, temporal and otherwise, may be considered in the reasonableness
analysis.166 One commentator emphasized that the method relies on already
familiar legal principles of causation where officers may have created the
circumstances that required force and the civilian’s response might constitute
a superseding cause.167
2. The Second Circuit’s Narrow Approach
In Salim v. Proulx,168 the Second Circuit held that courts should consider
only officers’ knowledge and actions immediately before and at the moment

159. Cynthia Lee, Reforming the Law on Police Use of Deadly Force: De-escalation,
Preseizure Conduct, and Imperfect Self-Defense, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 629, 679, 684.
Professor Lee further explains that even if an officer increased the risk of a deadly encounter
by acting negligently or violating police procedures, a jury could still find that the officer’s
use of force was reasonable. Id. at 685.
160. Id. at 673.
161. Abraham, 183 F.3d at 291.
162. Kimber, supra note 157, at 676.
163. Id. (“The incident is the combination of all the interactions between the actors
involved, so there is no reason why the actions of one of those actors should always be
excluded.”).
164. See Cara McClellan, Dismantling the Trap: Untangling the Chain of Events in
Excessive Force Claims, 8 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 17–18 (2017).
165. Id. at 28.
166. See, e.g., Avery, supra note 66, at 287 (“The Third Circuit’s decision in Abraham v.
Raso provides the clearest rule, and the one giving the word ‘totality’ in the ‘totality of the
circumstances’ standard its truest meaning.”); see also McClellan, supra note 164, at 22–23.
167. See McClellan, supra note 164, at 22–23.
168. 93 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 1996).
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they seized the plaintiff with deadly force.169 The Fourth,170 Fifth,171
Eighth,172 and Eleventh Circuits173 also examine reasonableness at the
moment seizure occurs. In the case of fleeing suspects, this framework is
grounded in the notion that no seizure occurs until an officer uses force to
stop a fleeing suspect because the suspect did not submit to the first
demonstration of police authority.174 This framework also contemplates the
need for instant decision-making in dangerous situations.175
a. A Narrow Time Line of Totality of the Circumstances: Immediately
Before and at the Moment of Seizure
In Salim, the Second Circuit established its narrow view while examining
an incident where the defendant, Officer William Proulx, attempted to
apprehend fourteen-year-old Eric Reyes, who had escaped from juvenile
detention and evaded arrest twice.176 Officer Proulx saw Reyes near Reyes’s
home and pursued him when Reyes ran.177 Reyes threw a rock that hit the
officer’s arm and head.178 Officer Proulx fired a warning shot, believing
Reyes had a knife; Reyes was in fact unarmed.179 After the officer caught
Reyes and they fell to the ground, a five-minute struggle ensued in which
children between the ages of eight and twelve came and began hitting Officer
Proulx.180 The officer had a handgun in his pocket and wore plain clothes.181

169. Id. at 92.
170. See, e.g., Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1996) (focusing on the moment
immediately before firing, where the decedent had his finger on the trigger of a hidden gun
while handcuffed, seated in the police car with the seat belt fastened and the window up, and
the officers stood nearby); Greenidge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789, 792 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding
that Graham requires the fact finder to examine the officer’s actions immediately prior to and
at the moment she made the split-second judgment to shoot and should exclude evidence of
the officer’s actions leading up to the moment immediately before the shooting).
171. See, e.g., Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1274 (5th Cir. 1992) (analyzing
the moment of fatal shooting when the decedent tried to hit an officer with his truck, focusing
less on the plainclothes officer’s failure to identify himself).
172. See, e.g., Schulz v. Long, 44 F.3d 643, 648 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he reasonableness
inquiry extends only to those facts known to the officer at the precise moment the officers
effectuate the seizure.”); cf. Avery, supra note 66, at 282.
173. See, e.g., Menuel v. City of Atlanta, 25 F.3d 990, 995 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that
officers did not seize the emotionally disturbed decedent when they entered her home,
surrounded her, and confined her to a bedroom, because she still had sufficient freedom to
respond, and that seizure occurred only when the officers killed her after she fired at them).
174. See Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[P]re-seizure conduct is
not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.”). But see Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 291
(3d Cir. 1999) (expressing disagreement with courts that have held that the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness analysis requires fact finders to exclude “any evidence of events preceding the
actual ‘seizure’”).
175. See Salim v. Proulx, 93 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 1996).
176. Id. at 88.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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Officer Proulx saw Reyes’s hand touch the gun and he fatally shot Reyes as
a result.182
The plaintiff, Reyes’s mother, argued that Officer Proulx created the
situation where deadly force became likely to occur by violating several
police procedures leading up to the shooting.183 The plaintiff tried to frame
the incident as one in which the officer unreasonably used deadly force to
arrest Reyes or prevent Reyes from escaping.184 However, the court
considered a narrower time line in determining the totality of the
circumstances and viewed the situation as one of self-defense where the
“‘immediate threat’ criterion controls” the analysis.185
When describing the circumstances, the court focused on the moment
Officer Proulx fired the weapon.186 Under that framework, the court
considered that, at the moment Officer Proulx shot Reyes: (1) the officer had
pinned Reyes down, (2) Reyes was actively resisting, (3) other children were
hitting the officer, and (4) the officer believed Reyes’s hand had touched the
officer’s gun.187 The court found that these facts created the possibility
Reyes might gain control of the gun.188 Thus, the court found reasonable the
officer’s decision to shoot Reyes fatally because other reasonable officers in
that position would have done the same.189
The court agreed with the Seventh Circuit that evidence of officers’
preseizure conduct creating the need to use deadly force is irrelevant to the
reasonableness analysis.190 Rather than including whether the officer created
the situation as another factor to consider, the court asserted “[t]he
reasonableness inquiry depends only upon the officer’s knowledge of
circumstances immediately prior to and at the moment that he made the splitsecond decision to employ deadly force.”191 Yet, the court did not discuss
the totality of the circumstances standard.192
b. Arguments for the Second Circuit’s Framework: Hindsight,
Overdeterrence, and Irrelevant Police Conduct
Professor Lee has emphasized the importance of recognizing that officers
risk their lives to protect the public and sometimes must decide on a course
of action quickly in fast-changing situations with only the information
available to them at the time, which could ultimately turn out to be wrong.193
The Second Circuit’s narrow approach accounts for the split-second
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 91.
Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1988)).
Id.
Id. at 91–92.
Id. at 92.
Id.
Id.; see infra Part II.A.3.
Id.
See Avery, supra note 66, at 280.
Lee, supra note 159, at 690.
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decisions officers must often make in the line of duty.194 The narrow view
also heeds Graham’s notion that courts should proceed with caution and not
second-guess police actions with the luxury of twenty-twenty hindsight.195
As a public policy concern, Professor Lawrence Rosenthal has argued that
including officers’ preseizure conduct in the reasonableness analysis of their
use of force would make it easier to impose liability on officers, which could
lead to “over-deterrence.”196 Officers may increasingly hesitate to enforce
laws out of fear of liability, which could endanger civilians’ and officers’
lives by encouraging offenders to commit more crimes.197 Professor John
Jeffries has further explained that, in response to the threat of legal claims,
officers might make choices that seek to minimize the costs of their actions,
such as choosing inaction.198
The narrow view also protects officers who are simply negligent, which
comports with the Fifth Circuit’s assertion in Fraire v. City of Arlington199
that an officer’s creation of the circumstances giving rise to force, like in
Salim, where the officer did not follow police procedure,200 is negligence at
most but not a constitutional violation under § 1983.201
Another argument for the narrow view is that it may be more in line with
what the Supreme Court considers a seizure under California v. Hodari D.,202
in which the Supreme Court defined what constitutes a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment. Because seizure does not occur until an officer uses
physical force or shows authority to which a person submits, an officer’s
actions before using force may not be part of the actual seizure.203 An
officer’s actions before the actual moment of seizure, such as when an officer
uses lethal force or nondeadly force like a choke hold, would be ignored
under the narrow view.204 Thus, even when plaintiffs argue that police
actions before the shooting created the eventual need to shoot and that police
could have acted in a way that would have required less force, courts
following the narrow view disregard this evidence.205

194. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
195. Id.
196. Lawrence Rosenthal, Good and Bad Ways to Address Police Violence, 48 URB. LAW.
675, 717–19 (2016).
197. Id.
198. See John C. Jeffries Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 267
(2000).
199. 957 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1992).
200. See Salim v. Proulx, 93 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 1996).
201. Fraire, 957 F.2d at 1276.
202. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
203. Id. at 625–26; see also Lacks, supra note 22, at 425–26.
204. See Kimber, supra note 157, at 666.
205. Cf. Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 291–92 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating the need to
examine preceding events to assess the reasonableness of the shooting). The Third Circuit
highlighted the difficulty in adhering to the exact moment of seizure by asking: “Do you
include what Raso saw when she squeezed the trigger? Under at least some interpretations of
Hodari, Abraham evidently was not seized until after the bullet left the barrel and actually
struck him.” Id. at 291.
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3. The Seventh Circuit’s Segmented Approach
In Plakas v. Drinski,206 the Seventh Circuit divided the circumstances
surrounding the use of force into segments and examined the reasonableness
of police conduct in each segment individually.207 The court provided a
somewhat vague rule about how to “carve up the incident” but explained that
officers’ actions at an earlier time would not necessarily make their actions
in later stages unreasonable.208 The Sixth Circuit generally supports this
analysis.209
a. A Segmented View of Totality of the Circumstances: Individual Stages
of Reasonableness
The Seventh Circuit created this segmentation framework in Plakas, in
which it held the defendant, Deputy Jeffrey Drinski, reasonably fatally shot
the decedent Konstantino Plakas in light of the circumstances as a whole.210
Police first encountered Plakas as he walked along the road after his car had
crashed into a ditch.211 Police smelled alcohol on his breath and drove him
back to the scene, and he agreed to go to the sheriff’s department to submit
to a test for intoxication.212 After one officer frisked and handcuffed him,
Plakas said the handcuffs hurt the burn scars on his chest.213 Plakas then
entered the police car after the officer explained that the officer must follow
department policy.214
While driving to the sheriff’s department, the officer hit the brakes when
he heard the rear door open and saw Plakas fleeing.215 Police followed
Plakas to his fiancée’s home, where he claimed the officer hurt him.216
Plakas then grabbed a poker and struck the officer on the wrist.217 Deputy
Drinski, arriving later, saw Plakas leave the house and followed him with his
gun drawn.218 Deputy Drinski and two other officers pursued Plakas to a
clearing in the woods.219 Still holding the poker, Plakas said his burn scars
206. 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. 1994).
207. Id. at 1150.
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., Greathouse v. Couch, 433 F. App’x 370, 372–73 (6th Cir. 2011) (“We apply
a ‘segmented approach’ to excessive-force claims, in which we ‘carve up’ the events
surrounding the challenged police action and evaluate the reasonableness of the force by
looking only at the moments immediately preceding the officer’s use of force.”); Claybrook
v. Birchwell, 274 F.3d 1098, 1103–04 (6th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the court followed other
circuits in analyzing excessive force claims by dividing the relevant circumstances into
“temporal segments”); see also Avery, supra note 66, at 285.
210. Plakas, 19 F.3d at 1150.
211. Id. at 1144.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1144–45.
216. Id. at 1145.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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hurt and allegedly stated, “Either you’re going to die here or I’m going to die
here.”220 Plakas then ran toward Deputy Drinski and Deputy Drinski shot
Plakas in the chest.221 Deputy Drinski believed a tree prevented him from
retreating as Plakas ran toward him.222
As in Abraham, Deputy Drinski argued and the court emphasized that this
excessive force case involved force used for self-defense rather than to
prevent escape.223 The court held that Deputy Drinski acted reasonably when
he shot Plakas.224 It analyzed the circumstances by dividing the incident into
five stages to determine the reasonableness of police action at each stage.225
First, the officers could have reasonably arrested Plakas for drunk driving
after meeting Plakas on the road where he exhibited signs of intoxication.226
Second, the officers reasonably pursued a person fleeing arrest.227 Third, the
officers reasonably drew their firearms and aimed them at Plakas because he
held a poker and injured one officer’s wrist.228 Fourth, it was reasonable for
the officers to pursue Plakas to the forest clearing after he committed the
violent offense against the officer.229 Fifth, Deputy Drinski tried to convince
Plakas to drop the poker and surrender.230 Analyzing these segments, the
court concluded that Deputy Drinski reasonably fired his weapon when
Plakas charged at him with the poker.231 The court held that unreasonable
police conduct at an earlier segment would not affect the reasonableness of
later conduct because the court considers each segment individually.232 If
conduct at four of the five stages was reasonable, unreasonable conduct at
one stage would not render conduct at all stages unreasonable.233
Yet, like Salim, Plakas did not discuss the totality of the circumstances
standard.234 The Seventh Circuit found preseizure conduct irrelevant to the
reasonableness analysis, but its application of this rule has been less
definitive.235 The Seventh Circuit discussed previous temporal stages
depicting Plakas’s behavior as relevant to the moment Deputy Drinski chose
to shoot.236 The court highlighted not only Deputy Drinski’s attempt to talk

220. Id. at 1146.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.; see Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 293 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that Officer Raso
argued she acted out of self-defense when she shot Abraham because she believed Abraham
was trying to hit her with his car).
224. Plakas, 19 F.3d at 1150.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See id. (“We do not return to the prior segments of the event and, in light of hindsight,
reconsider whether the prior police decisions were correct.”).
234. See Avery, supra note 66, at 279–80, 284.
235. See id. at 284–85, 287.
236. Plakas, 19 F.3d at 1150.
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with Plakas but also other officers’ conduct, from the first stage to the last.237
Consequently, the court did not completely disregard all the actions leading
up to the seizure.238
The court cited Tom v. Voida239 as a “classic example” of the application
of the segmented approach.240 An officer stopped to help Tom who had
fallen from a bicycle; Tom fled, and the officer pursued.241 Tom pushed the
officer’s head into the concrete and ran.242 The officer warned Tom three
times, “[p]lease. Don’t make me shoot you,” before eventually shooting
when Tom lunged.243 The court did not restrict its analysis to the moment
the officer drew her weapon and shot Tom when Tom lunged.244 The court
included Tom’s and the officer’s previous actions, from the moment the
officer saw Tom fall on the street and tried to help, through the chase and
Tom’s violent behavior, to the moment seizure occurred when the officer
shot Tom.245
b. Arguments for the Seventh Circuit’s Framework: Split-Second
Judgments and the Legally Relevant Time Frame
One argument for the segmented approach posits that, like the Second
Circuit’s narrow approach, the Seventh Circuit’s method strictly follows
Graham’s hesitation regarding the dangers and uncertainties officers face in
civilian encounters and limits courts’ ability to second-guess officers’ splitsecond decisions.246 The Seventh Circuit cautioned against second-guessing
police because reviewing actions beyond the exact moment officers use force
may always reveal different decisions they could have made that would have
led to different outcomes.247
In Plakas, the court explained that defining the legally relevant time frame
of events, which may be quite short, is vital in excessive force cases.248 The
court described split-second decision-making as the “briefest reflection”
officers make before deciding to shoot someone fatally.249 The court noted
that officers who perceive danger to their own lives would not think about
nonlethal alternatives in that moment, even though they have alternatives; for
237. Id. at 1147–49.
238. See id. at 1150; see also Avery, supra note 66, at 283–84.
239. 963 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. 1992).
240. Plakas, 19 F.3d at 1150.
241. Tom, 963 F.2d at 954–55.
242. Id. at 955.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 960–62.
245. Id.
246. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989); see also Jack Zouhary, A Jedi
Approach to Excessive Force Claims: May the Reasonable Force Be with You, 50 U. TOL. L.
REV. 1, 10–11 (2018).
247. See Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1994). But see McClellan, supra
note 164, at 31–32 (arguing that considering officers’ causally relevant actions that led to the
use of additional force may prevent overly aggressive tactics in civilian encounters).
248. Plakas, 19 F.3d at 1150.
249. Id. at 1149.
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instance, Deputy Drinski could have retreated or used a colleague’s tear
gas.250 The court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require police to
use the least deadly, or even less deadly, alternatives as long as their
particular use of force is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.251
One scholar recognized that a “strength of the segmented approach” is that
it provides flexibility to adjust the reasonableness analysis to complex and
changing situations.252 However, this scholar also noted that this flexibility
can lead to inconsistent results and does not sufficiently account for the
relationship between a series of events that has resulted in the use of force.253
B. Canadian Law Comparison: De-escalation Measures, Preseizure
Conduct, and the “Reasonable Grounds” Standard
This part analyzes Canadian excessive force cases in light of the U.S.
circuit courts’ broad, narrow, and segmented approaches. In addition to its
geographic proximity, other factors render Canadian jurisprudence a useful
point of comparison. Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees
rights akin to the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures.254 Canadian law also authorizes police to employ
lethal force only when they reasonably believe suspects pose an imminent
threat of serious injury or death to officers or others.255
Further, the Canadian government does not generally have a systematic
method to document encounters between police and the public where force
is used,256 just as the United States does not have an official national database
to record police-involved deaths.257 The Canadian government tracks fatal
police shootings if the officer is criminally charged.258 However, in the
province of Ontario, as of January 1, 2020, the Anti-Racism Act259 requires
the Ontario Ministry of the Solicitor General to collect data on the race of
individuals involved in use-of-force incidents to identify and monitor

250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See McClellan, supra note 164, at 14–15.
253. See id. at 15–16 (“[A] test that focuses on dividing pre-seizure evidence based on
temporal limitations is not suited to analyze a dynamic interaction between an officer and a
civilian.”).
254. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).
255. See Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, § 25(4).
256. See Inayat Singh, 2020 Already a Particularly Deadly Year for People Killed in Police
Encounters, CBC Research Shows, CBC NEWS (July 23, 2020), https://newsinteractives.
cbc.ca/fatalpoliceencounters/ [https://perma.cc/DTW4-AV5J].
257. See Frazee, supra note 60.
258. Michael James, Video in Toronto Killings Shows Divide Between U.S. and Canada
Deadly Force, USA TODAY (Apr. 26, 2018, 4:16 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/2018/04/26/video-toronto-killings-shows-divide-between-u-s-and-canada-deadlyforce/551798002/ [https://perma.cc/C4SN-MN65] (highlighting that a University of Toronto
criminology student lamented the lack of a centralized database for police violence).
259. S.O. 2017, c 15 (Can.).
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potential racial bias in policing.260 When officers use a firearm or other
weapon, Ontario police must complete a “Use of Force Report.”261
In Canada, much like in the United States, the effects of police use of force
are felt disproportionately by race and by gender.262 Black and Indigenous
Canadians are more likely to be killed by police than non-Black or nonIndigenous Canadians.263 Black individuals comprised 2.92 percent of the
Canadian population over the past twenty years but were 8.63 percent of
civilian deaths caused by police.264 Indigenous persons comprised only 4.21
percent of the Canadian population but were 16 percent of deaths caused by
police.265 In addition, a Statistics Canada study found that in 2012, one in
five people who had a police encounter had a mental disability.266
1. Police Use of Force in the United States and Canada
Despite the similarities, stark contrasts exist between police use of force in
the United States and Canada. There are generally far fewer civilian deaths
caused by police in Canada than in the United States.267 The first
comprehensive analysis of fatal encounters with Canadian police, using data
from ten major police forces, found that 461 fatal police encounters occurred
from 2000 to 2017.268
This number is much lower than the 999 fatal police encounters in the
United States in 2019,269 which may be partly due to the nations’ different
population sizes.270 As another striking example, in 2017, Winnipeg,
Canada, saw only five police shootings of civilians, two of which resulted in
deaths.271 Canadian police training may partly explain the fewer deaths
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id.
Id.
Singh, supra note 256.
Id.
Id.
Id.
JILLIAN BOYCE ET AL., CANADIAN CTR. FOR JUST. STAT., MENTAL HEALTH AND
CONTACT WITH POLICE IN CANADA, 2012, at 14 (2015), https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/
pub/85-002-x/2015001/article/14176-eng.pdf?st=jwlTwewj [https://perma.cc/LE7P-G2H8].
267. See Lartey, supra note 11 (stating that Canadian police fatally shoot an average of
twenty-five people per year, whereas in 2015, police in California alone, a state with a 10
percent larger population than Canada, fatally shot nearly seventy-five people in just five
months).
268. See Jacques Marcoux & Katie Nicholson, Deadly Force: Fatal Encounters with
Police in Canada: 2000–2017, CBC NEWS (2018), https://newsinteractives.cbc.ca/longformcustom/deadly-force [https://perma.cc/Q3QF-KCUA].
269. Tate et al., supra note 13.
270. In 2015, nearly 285 million more people lived in the United States than in Canada.
See International Programs: Demographic Overview—Custom Region—United States, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/data-tools/demo/idb/region.php?T=13&RT=
0&A=both&Y=2015&C=US&R= [https://perma.cc/M22K-L25Y] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020);
Population Estimates on July 1st, by Age and Sex, STATS. CAN., https://www150.
statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1710000501 [https://perma.cc/T4DU-S6KR].
271. Holly Caruk, 4 Police Shootings in 2019 ‘A Lot’: Watchdog, CBC NEWS (Mar. 4,
2019), https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/police-shooting-toll-city-cops-union-1.504
2477 [https://perma.cc/3E48-TT58].
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because it focuses on de-escalation, rather than confrontation.272 Toronto
Police Service data show that of 30,000 encounters with suspects in 2017,
Toronto police used force in only around 0.5 percent.273
CBC News data suggests that Canadian police fatally shoot an average of
approximately nineteen civilians per year.274 Of the 461 civilians killed by
police from 2000 to 2017, approximately 116 were unarmed and nearly twothirds were killed when police shot them.275 One law enforcement scholar at
Canada’s Simon Fraser University has stated that people have a higher
chance of surviving encounters with Canadian police than with U.S.
police.276
Another important difference is the greater availability of firearms in the
United States.277 According to the Small Arms Survey, the United States had
over 393 million civilian-held guns in 2017 (about 46 percent of the
worldwide total) but Canada had only about thirteen million.278 Canada also
has a far lower gun crime rate.279 American police may be more likely to
employ greater degrees of force because people they encounter are more
likely to have guns.280
2. The Canadian Charter and Criminal Code
In 1982, the United Kingdom enacted the Canada Act of 1982, which
incorporated the Constitution Act of 1982 and ended the U.K. Parliament’s
legislative authority over Canada.281 Part I of the Constitution Act of 1982
set out the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“the Charter”),
constitutionalizing fundamental rights and freedoms for any person in
Canada in matters related to government action.282
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

See James, supra note 258.
See id.
Marcoux & Nicholson, supra note 268.
Id.
James, supra note 258.
See id.
AARON KARP, SMALL ARMS SURV., ESTIMATING GLOBAL CIVILIAN-HELD FIREARMS
NUMBERS 4 (2018), http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/
SAS-BP-Civilian-Firearms-Numbers.pdf [https://perma.cc/G44V-VC6U].
279. See Anna Alvazzi del Frate, A Matter of Survival: Non-lethal Firearm Violence, in
SMALL ARMS SURV., SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2012, at 79, 93 (2012), http://
www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2012/eng/Small-Arms-Survey-2012Chapter-03-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/975T-MYF4].
280. See David Hemenway et al., Variations in Fatal Police Shootings Across US States:
The Role of Firearm Availability, 96 J. URB. HEALTH 63, 71 (2019) (finding a correlation
between household gun ownership and killings by police).
281. ADAM DODEK, THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION 36–37 (Jenny McWha ed., 2d ed. 2016).
The Canada Act of 1982 distributed legislative authority among the federal government and
Canada’s ten provinces—Alberta British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick,
Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Québec, and
Saskatchewan. Canada’s three territories, the Northwest Territories, Nunavut, and Yukon, fall
within its federal legislative authority. Id. at 39.
282. See id. at 37; see also Guide to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, GOV’T
OF CAN. (June 8, 2020), https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/services/how-rightsprotected/guide-canadian-charter-rights-freedoms.html [https://perma.cc/9JEC-D78T].
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Section 7 of the Charter guarantees “life, liberty and security of person,”
and Section 8 provides the “right to be secure against unreasonable search or
seizure.”283 Section 24(1) delineates the right to bring suit when “rights or
freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied.”284
In Canadian law, “seizure” is defined narrowly.285 Under section 8,
seizure is the “taking of a thing from a person by a public authority without
that person’s consent.”286 Courts employ a totality of the circumstances test
to determine whether seizure of such property is reasonable.287
Section 7 protections of liberty often refer to guarding persons in a
physical sense in incidents of physical restraint, such as imprisonment,288 or
state actions affecting one’s ability to move freely.289 The purpose of section
7 is to conform government activities interfering with “life, liberty and
security” to principles of “justice and fair process.”290 Courts examine
section 7 in two steps: (1) whether a government actor deprived someone of
life, liberty, or security of the person; and (2) whether the deprivation
conformed to fundamental principles of justice.291
Plaintiffs must show a “sufficient causal connection” between the alleged
government action and the deprivation of life, liberty, or security.292
Plaintiffs satisfy this standard by establishing a reasonable inference by
balancing probabilities.293 Courts focus on the right to life where a
defendant’s action directly or indirectly caused death or increased the risk of
death.294

283. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). One difference between the Charter and the
U.S. Bill of Rights is that section 1 of the Charter explicitly directs courts to balance the rights
guaranteed by the Charter against the government’s right to reasonably limit those rights. Id.
(“[The] Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out
in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society.”).
284. Id. § 24(1).
285. See SUSANNE BOUCHER & KENNETH LANDA, UNDERSTANDING SECTION 8: SEARCH,
SEIZURE, AND THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION 11 (2005).
286. R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, 431 (Can.).
287. R. v. Cole, 2012 SCC 53, para. 39, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34, 47 (Can.). The reasonableness
grounds requirement for excessive force claims is found in section 25 of Canada’s Criminal
Code. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, § 25.1.
288. R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636, 652 (Can.).
289. R. v. Heywood, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761, 789 (Can.). This concept is similar to Hodari
D.’s definition of “seizure,” where officers must show authority that restricts a person’s ability
to move freely. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625–26 (1991).
290. See Charkaoui v. Canada, 2007 SCC 9, para. 19, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 371 (Can.).
291. See, e.g., R. v. White, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 417, 436 (Can.); R. v. S. (R.J.), [1995] 1 S.C.R.
451, 479 (Can.).
292. See Canada (Att’y Gen.) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, para. 76, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101,
1138–39 (Can.).
293. Id.
294. See Chaoulli v. Quebec (Att’y Gen.), 2005 SCC 35, paras. 112–24, [2005] 1 S.C.R
791, 846–850 (Can.); see also Carter v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), 2015 SCC 5, para. 62, [2015] 1
S.C.R 331, 367 (Can.).
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Unlike in the United States, in Canada, criminal law falls exclusively
within the federal jurisdiction.295 Under section 25(1) of Canada’s Criminal
Code, law enforcement, including private persons and peace officers, may
use “as much [legally authorized] force as is necessary.”296 Section 25
shields officers from criminal or civil liability only if the law sufficiently
justified their uses of force.297 Under the “reasonable grounds” standard,
officers have legal authorization to exercise force if they reasonably believe
that using force likely to cause death or serious bodily harm is necessary to
protect officers or others from death or serious harm.298
In addition to requiring reasonable grounds for officers to employ
necessary force, the code lists certain considerations for analyzing whether
the use of force was justified.299 The Canada Criminal Code factors include:
whether police arrested the suspect with or without a warrant, the suspect’s
alleged offense, whether the suspect fled to avoid arrest, whether such flight
could reasonably be prevented by less violent means (unlike U.S. Supreme
Court precedent),300 and whether officers reasonably believed the degree of
force was necessary to protect officers and others from imminent or future
death or serious bodily harm.301
Finally, section 26 of the code explicitly states that all law enforcement
officers who are authorized to use force are “criminally responsible for any
excess thereof according to the nature and quality of the act that constitutes
the excess.”302 Thus, permissible police interference with individual liberty,
including exerting nondeadly or deadly force against a person, must be no
more than what is reasonably necessary to prevent death or serious harm to
officers or others.303
The next section highlights elements in Canadian use-of-force cases as
they align with or differ from the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits.

295. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11, § 91(27)
(U.K.).
296. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, § 25.1.
297. See, e.g., Sharpe v. London Police Serv. Bd., [2010] O.J. No. 4720 (Can. Ont. Super.
Ct. J.) (holding that sections 25 and 26 authorize police to use as much force as reasonably
necessary to prevent people from interfering in lawful arrests); see also Eccles v. Bourque,
[1975] 2 S.C.R. 739, 742 (Can.) (holding that plainclothes but armed police who trespassed to
make an arrest acted reasonably and were justified on common-law principles). But see R. v.
Asante-Mensah, 2003 SCC 38, para. 4, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 3, 9 (Can.) (holding that determining
reasonableness of force in terms of trespass to property to accomplish an arrest requires the
court “to focus on what is reasonable in all the circumstances”).
298. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, § 25.
299. Id.
300. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 556–57 (1976).
301. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, § 25.
302. Id. § 26. Under justification provisions, specially designated officers are immune
from unlawful acts while enforcing federal law or during investigations. Officers must receive
written authorization unless the unlawful act was necessary to preserve someone’s life, avoid
compromising covert operations, or prevent imminent loss of evidence for indictable offences.
Id. § 25.
303. See R. v. Asante-Mensah, 2003 SCC 38, para. 58, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 3, 31 (Can.).
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3. Circumstances Canadian Courts Consider
In Canada, a holistic view of the context is relevant to determining the
reasonableness of an officer’s actions in excessive force claims,304 similar to
the Third Circuit’s Fourth Amendment standard.305 To decide the
reasonableness of police use of force in an arrest, in R. v. Nasogaluak,306 the
Supreme Court of Canada looked not only at the immediate moment officers
exerted force but also at an earlier point in time when police received a tip
about an intoxicated driver.307 In a case where a court analyzed two instances
of police forcibly taking an emotionally disturbed man to a hospital, the
Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador even examined a phone call
a bystander had had with an officer long before officers arrived on the
scene.308 When analyzing the reasonableness of police conduct in the
excessive force claim, the court focused on events preceding the moment at
issue, including the police conduct that led to the use of force.309 In another
case, to determine the reasonableness of an officer firing a projectile to
suppress a riot, the court found the officer’s training, experience, and orders
of the day relevant to the reasonable grounds analysis and that a judge should
be a “doppelganger” to officers, accompanying them throughout relevant
events.310
In Canada, whether police attempt to de-escalate the situation also plays a
role in evaluating excessive force claims, and this evaluation involves
reviewing officers’ preseizure conduct.311 In 2013, after the fatal shooting
of an eighteen-year-old Toronto civilian armed with a switchblade knife, the
Ontario ombudsman312 began investigating Ontario police de-escalation
training for situations where force might be used.313 In 2014, the Toronto
304. See Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 168 (Can.) (“[W]here the state’s
interest is not simply law enforcement as, for instance, where state security is involved, or
where the individual’s interest is not simply his expectation of privacy as, for instance, when
the search threatens his bodily integrity, the relevant standard might well be a different one.”).
305. See supra Part II.A.2.
306. 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206 (Can.).
307. Id. para. 10.
308. See generally Meadus v. Royal Nfld. Constabulary Pub. Complaints Comm’n, 335
NFLD & P.E.I.R. 46 (Can. Nfld. Sup. Ct. Trial Div. (Gen.)).
309. Id.
310. See Berntt v. Vancouver (City), 1999 CarswellBC 1197, paras. 24–25 (Can. B.C.
C.A.) (WL).
311. See Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, para. 10; see also Kevin Cyr, Police Use of Force:
Assessing Necessity and Proportionality, 53 ALTA. L. REV. 663, 666–67 (2016) (asserting that
whether “police attempt to de-escalate situations before using force is either an increasing
expectation by the public and the courts, or one that is becoming more clearly defined” and
that “[t]his increased focus on de-escalation has resulted in tangible new requirements placed
on the police”).
312. See
Ombudsman,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/ombudsman [https://perma.cc/3VZG-ZG49] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020) (defining
ombudsman as “a government official . . . appointed to receive and investigate complaints
made by individuals against abuses or capricious acts of public officials”).
313. See generally PAUL DUBÉ, OMBUDSMAN OF ONT. A MATTER OF LIFE AND DEATH
(2016),
https://www.ombudsman.on.ca/Files/sitemedia/Documents/OntarioOmbudsman
DeescalationEN_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4KS-J2DC].
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Police Service asked Justice Frank Iacobucci, a former justice of the Supreme
Court of Canada, to review its lethal force training and policies, especially
with mentally disabled individuals.314 Justice Iacobucci’s findings focused
on de-escalation tactics.315 The report emphasized that force must be
reasonably necessary in the circumstances and “should always be a last
resort” because “[r]esolving conflicts through communication rather than
force is the goal.”316
As a result of this increased focus on de-escalation, Canadian policing
policies have changed.317 For example, British Columbia implemented a
policy under which officers must first try to de-escalate a situation before
using conducted electrical weapon tasers.318 One scholar, a former member
of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for fourteen years, reasoned that other
exercises of force, not only tasers, should create an obligation to de-escalate
before using force.319 In addition, the Edmonton Police Service and
University of Alberta researchers explored ways to improve police
encounters with mentally disabled individuals and helped train officers in
communication and de-escalation techniques.320 Within six months, deadly
and nondeadly force used toward people with mental disabilities decreased
by over 40 percent, although other initiatives may have contributed to the
decrease as well.321
Canadian courts recognize that police endure certain intense and quickly
changing situations, just as Salim emphasized based on Graham and
Garner.322 Like Graham, Berntt v. Vancouver (City)323 warned against
judges analyzing officer conduct through twenty-twenty hindsight.324 The
Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged that “the police are often required
to make split-second decisions in fluid and potentially dangerous
314. FRANK IACOBUCCI, TORONTO POLICE SERV., POLICE ENCOUNTERS WITH PEOPLE IN
CRISIS 14 (2014), https://www.torontopolice.on.ca/publications/files/reports/police_
encounters_with_people_in_crisis_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NRC-L5MB].
315. Id. at 17, 153.
316. Id. at 194.
317. See, e.g., Olivia Bowden, Tory Tables ‘Sweeping’ Reforms to Toronto Police,
Including Budget Reallocation, CBC (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/
toronto/tory-police-reform-1.5681916 [https://perma.cc/N4NM-ZK48].
318. See Provincial Policing Standards, B.C. 2 (Feb. 1, 2015), https://www2.gov.bc.ca/
assets/gov/law-crime-and-justice/criminal-justice/police/standards/1-3-1-threshold-andcircumstances-of-use.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YWU-CFME].
319. See Cyr, supra note 311, at 667.
320. Id. at 667–68; Yasmeen I. Krameddine & Peter H. Silverstone, How to Improve
Interactions Between Police and the Mentally Ill, FRONTIERS PSYCHIATRY, Jan. 2015, at 1, 1.
321. Krameddine & Silverstone, supra note 320, at 2 (explaining that other initiatives
included training to increase empathy and verbal and nonverbal communication).
322. See, e.g., R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, para. 35, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, 228 (Can.)
(noting policing is dangerous and mandates quick reactions in emergencies); R. v. Bottrell,
1981 CanLII 339, para. 14 (Can. B.C. C.A.) (cautioning against using hindsight).
323. 1997 CarswellBC 320 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.) (WL), rev’d 1999 CarswellBC 1197 (Can.
B.C. C.A.) (WL).
324. See id. para. 108 (“It is one thing to have the time in a trial over several days to
reconstruct and examine the events . . . . It is another to be a policeman in the middle of [an
emergency].”).

2020]

TIME OVER MATTER

1061

situations.”325 While requiring police to use the least force necessary to
arrest or otherwise seize suspects may place police and others in unnecessary
danger,326 courts also recognize that inappropriate police action where an
officer unreasonably deviates from established training is an important aspect
to consider in assessing reasonableness.327
In Puricelli v. Toronto Police Services Board,328 the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice found that police should “explain why an obvious alternative
but less dangerous course of action was not taken.”329 The inclusion of
officer conduct that may have provoked later force in the analysis of the
circumstances suggests that police should try to avoid creating exigent
circumstances by initially utilizing less forceful alternatives.330
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S CAUSALLY RELEVANT APPROACH IS TRUEST TO
GRAHAM’S TOTALITY LANGUAGE
This part proposes that the best approach to assessing the totality of the
circumstances in measuring the reasonableness of officer conduct in
plaintiffs’ § 1983 excessive force claims is the Third Circuit’s broad
approach, which includes both officers’ and plaintiffs’ causally relevant
preseizure conduct. It further concludes that circuit courts should adopt
Canada’s emphasis on de-escalation so that officers’ adherence to or
deviation from de-escalation training will be a causally relevant factor that
weighs heavily in the reasonableness analysis.
When courts consider the reasonableness of the use of deadly force, how
explicitly should they consider opportunities for using nondeadly force to
neutralize or avoid the alleged threat? Incorporating the Third Circuit’s
causal method, particularly, weighing de-escalation as a significant relevant
factor, would allow the circuits to formalize this variable in a tangible way.
Part III.A compares the strengths and weaknesses of the three circuit
approaches and discusses why the Third Circuit’s approach best assesses the
totality of the circumstances in measuring the reasonableness of officer
conduct in excessive force claims. Part III.B examines the importance of
including de-escalation training as a relevant causal factor and accompanying
policy considerations.

325. See R. v. Aucoin, 2012 SCC 66, para. 40, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 408, 421 (Can.).
326. See Anderson v. Smith, 2000 CarswellBC 1651, para. 51 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.) (WL)
(“There is no requirement to use the least amount of force because this may expose the officer
to unnecessary danger to himself.”).
327. See generally R. v. Power (2016), 476 Sask. R. 91 (Can. Sask. C.A.) (including in the
reasonableness analysis whether the force used by a constable was in accordance with the
training provided to police officers); see also Cyr, supra note 311, at 668.
328. [2014] O.J. No. 5638 (Can. Ont. Super. Ct. J. Div.).
329. Id. para. 40 (quoting Chartier v. Greaves, [2001] O.J. No. 634, para. 64 (Can. Ont.
Super. Ct. J. Div.)).
330. See Cyr, supra note 311, at 668.
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A. Preseizure Conduct: Vital to Assessing Reasonableness
As reflected in the Third Circuit’s broad approach, understanding a
suspect’s and officer’s preseizure actions may be critical to decide the
reasonableness of the use of force. The Second Circuit’s narrow approach
does not fully encompass Graham’s notion of totality in assessing the
situation where an officer employed deadly or nondeadly force to seize.331
Limiting factors only to the precise moment of seizure separates facts from
the rest of the story.332 If the Second Circuit in Salim had considered that the
five people surrounding the officer were children and that the officer wore
plain clothes when chasing young Reyes and fired a shot before pinning
Reyes to the ground, violating police protocol, the court might have found
the shooting unreasonable under the circumstances as a whole.333
In another case, the Second Circuit disregarded that the suspect threatened
to shoot police minutes before they seized him.334 The police believed the
suspect concealed something behind his back when they entered the
premises.335 Thus, applying the “exact moment of seizure” method would
exclude context that may be important to determine the reasonableness of
conduct at the moment police employed force.
In Scott v. Harris,336 the Supreme Court questioned whether preseizure
conduct that influences the need for force is irrelevant for the reasonableness
analysis.337 In Scott, the suspect created a need for increased force by leading
police on a high-speed chase through a crowded town.338 The Court found
the deputy’s use of force, pushing his vehicle’s bumper into the suspect’s car
to end the dangerous chase, reasonable.339 In its reasonableness analysis, the
Court stated that the parties’ “[c]ulpability is relevant.”340 While Scott does
not overrule Salim, its ruling does suggest that because a suspect’s preseizure
conduct is relevant, this reasoning may similarly be extended to officers’
preseizure conduct.341
Further, the causation method of analyzing particular circumstances,
including preseizure actions, may be applied more evenly for both parties,
without unduly favoring one over the other.342 In contrast, the segmented
331. See Avery, supra note 66, at 280–83.
332. See Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 173 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that the defendant
emphasized the plaintiff’s resistance as important context for analyzing the officer’s force).
333. See Salim v. Proulx, 93 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 1996).
334. O’Bert ex rel. Est. of O’Bert v. Vargo, 331 F.3d 29, 39–40 (2d Cir. 2003).
335. Id. at 34.
336. 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
337. Id. at 383–84.
338. Id. at 372.
339. Id. at 384.
340. Id. at 384 n.10.
341. See Fortunati v. Campagne, 681 F. Supp. 2d 528, 543 n.13 (D. Vt. 2009) (stating that,
as the Court in Scott considered the suspect’s culpable conduct creating the need for force,
courts could also consider whether “police created the need for force” and that Scott at least
questions the scope of Salim’s holding), aff’d sub nom., Fortunati v. Vermont, 503 F. App’x
78 (2d Cir. 2012).
342. See Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 291 (3d Cir. 1999).
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approach selectively considers certain preseizure conduct but disregards
police provocation.343 The Seventh Circuit looks more at the plaintiff’s
preseizure conduct than the defendant’s, which may favor defendants and
result in courts applying the segmented approach unevenly among the
parties.344 Some may argue that considering antecedent conduct allows for
impermissible second-guessing of officers’ discretion using hindsight.
However, as proponents of the causation method emphasize, what officers
did or did not do before employing force is relevant to the totality of the
circumstances, and fact finders considering plaintiffs’ preseizure conduct
should consider officers’ conduct as well.345
Ignoring police actions before nondeadly or deadly force in the totality of
the circumstances context ignores the balance of interests Garner requires.346
Not all police encounters are split-second decisions.347 While police
provocation of force through noncompliance with procedure may establish
negligence and not a constitutional violation, Garner and Graham did not
preclude arguably unreasonable preseizure conduct from being part of the
totality of the circumstances.348 Therefore, analyses like the Second
Circuit’s framework, which only examines the immediate moment officers
shoot or use force, interpret totality of the circumstances too narrowly.349
Similarly, Plakas demonstrated one difficulty of applying its segmented
method: separating Deputy Drinski’s knowledge of Plakas and the situation
in earlier stages from the final deadly stage.350 It may be challenging to
choose exactly at which moments to divide the time frame, which may create
inconsistencies or even lead litigants to raise questions concerning
arbitrariness.351
For example, Deering v. Reich352 deviated from the Plakas approach by
employing a more expansive time frame.353 In Deering, at 12:45 a.m., three
deputies went to arrest Reinhold Deering, an elderly person who had been
formerly committed to a psychiatric hospital, for failing to appear in court
for a misdemeanor property damage charge stemming from backing his
vehicle into a parked motorcycle.354 After police knocked, Deering fired a

343. See Zouhary, supra note 246, at 15–17.
344. See id.
345. See id.; see also Lee, supra note 159, at 686.
346. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 2 (1985).
347. See Zouhary, supra note 246, at 10.
348. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 8 (“[R]easonableness depends on not only when a seizure is
made, but also how it is carried out.”); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
349. See, e.g., Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 291 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Kimber, supra
note 157, at 665.
350. See Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1994).
351. See Abraham, 183 F.3d at 291–92 (stating that with the segmented framework, courts
have no “principled way of explaining when ‘pre-seizure’ events start and, consequently, will
not have any defensible justification for why conduct prior to that chosen moment should be
excluded”); see also Zouhary, supra note 246, at 17.
352. 183 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 1999).
353. See id. at 650.
354. See id. at 648.

1064

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

shotgun at the officers.355 After repeatedly ordering Deering to lower the
In analyzing the
weapon, an officer shot and killed Deering.356
reasonableness of the officer’s conduct, the court considered not just
moments immediately before and during the seizure but also the crime, the
warrant and its service, the officer’s perception of danger, and what the
officer knew about the suspect.357 Despite the defendant’s argument that the
court should not consider preseizure conduct—such as Deering’s mental
state and age, the late time, and Deering’s living on an isolated farm—the
court found such information relevant.358
This different application of the segmented approach shows the challenge
of deciding when relevant factors begin when deconstructing the time line.359
Courts may find it difficult to draw temporal lines in situations that may span
from one or two minutes to multiple hours.360 This dissection can be
arbitrary. In contrast, the Third Circuit recognizes all factors bearing on
officers’ uses of force and weighs the importance of each based on causation,
rather than when the seizure occurred; by not having to cherry-pick which
parts of the preforce time line are relevant, the Third Circuit’s approach
avoids the appearance of arbitrariness.361
In addition, the Seventh Circuit’s approach does not consider when
officers’ actions contributed to the need for force.362 The Plakas court held
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit “creating unreasonably dangerous
circumstances” when arresting or otherwise seizing suspects.363
Further, the court recognized that all time frames begin with police
deciding to assist, arrest, question, and so on.364 The court reasoned, “In a
sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. But it is trouble which
the police officer is sworn to cause.”365 The court acknowledged that
defendant-officers in excessive force claims are often the only living
witnesses because they have killed the person most likely to contradict their
views of the relevant facts.366 Yet, the Plakas court found that officers at the
scene were sufficient witnesses to corroborate the defendant’s version of the
circumstances, despite the plaintiff’s arguments that a photograph suggested
the clearing provided ample room for Deputy Drinski to move safely away
355. See id.
356. See id.
357. See id. at 652.
358. See id. at 650.
359. See Zouhary, supra note 246, at 17 (stating that the segmented approach presents a
practical problem where courts have difficulty deciding which events to consider).
360. See id. at 23.
361. See McClellan, supra note 164, at 22–23 (“While courts that apply the segmented
approach struggle to analyze the relationship between a series of events, principles of
proximate causation provide workable rules for interpreting how to impose liability when a
series of events interact to produce a result.”).
362. See Zouhary, supra note 246, at 11.
363. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Carter v. Buscher, 973
F.2d 1328, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992)).
364. Id. at 1150.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 1147.
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from Plakas’s poker.367 Thus, the segmented approach is too rigid because
it excludes causal and contextual factors that may have impacted the seizure.
Plaintiffs in excessive force claims often do not argue unjustified police
use of force at the moment seizure occurred but that police conduct—
violating department policy or not using less violent alternatives—increased
the need for force and, therefore, was unreasonable and excessive.368
William Blackstone explained that reasonable deadly force constitutes an act
of “unavoidable necessity, without any will, intention, or desire, and without
any inadvertence or negligence . . . . But the law must require it, otherwise
it is not justifiable.”369 A standard most true to “unavoidable necessity,” also
emphasized in Canada’s Criminal Code and case law,370 must use officers’
preseizure conduct as a key factor, especially in excessive force claims
involving deadly force.
In the causally relevant test analyzing
reasonableness, courts should consider whether officers tried nonlethal
alternatives.
In Brower v. County of Inyo,371 the Supreme Court found that a roadblock
the suspect fatally crashed into constituted a seizure and remanded the case
for the lower court to determine whether police unreasonably constructed and
designed that roadblock.372 This holding supports the use of preseizure
conduct when analyzing reasonableness.373 In St. Hilaire v. City of
Laconia,374 the First Circuit interpreted Brower as holding that once courts
find seizure occurred, they should examine officers’ actions leading up to the
seizure.375 The Third Circuit agreed with this interpretation.376 While
Brower does not designate where to begin the time line and which preseizure
actions are most significant,377 the Third Circuit’s causation test does.
The Third Circuit’s method would also help resolve issues with
discrepancies between parties’ versions of events. How courts determine
whose version to credit when conducting the reasonableness calculus is
important. In excessive force cases, there is often only one side of the story
available because the witness for the other side is dead.378 In MurriettaGolding v. City of Fresno,379 Isiah Murrietta Golding’s mother asserted that
367. Id.
368. See Kimber, supra note 157, at 653–54.
369. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *132.
370. See Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, § 25(4).
371. 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
372. See id. at 599–600.
373. See Kimber, supra note 157, at 653–54.
374. 71 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1995).
375. Id. at 26.
376. Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 292 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[I]f preceding conduct could
not be considered, remand in Brower would have been pointless, for the only basis for saying
the seizure was unreasonable was the police’s pre-seizure planning and conduct.”).
377. See Brower, 489 U.S. at 598–600.
378. See Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1147 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[A] defendant knows that
the only person likely to contradict him or her is beyond reach.”).
379. No. 18-CV-0314, 2020 WL 6075757 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2020); see also Complaint
for Damages, Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 2, at
2.
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Isiah portrayed no violent behavior throughout the pursuit, and the officers
had no reason to believe Isiah was armed.380 According to Isiah’s mother,
the defendants stated they saw Isiah touch his waistband several times while
running.381 The Fresno County District Attorney’s Office, Fresno’s Office
of Independent Review, and the Fresno Police Department’s Internal Affairs
Bureau determined that the officers acted within policy because they saw
Isiah do so.382 The plaintiff alleged that, being small, Isiah was simply trying
to hold up his pants.383 The causal approach with a de-escalation factor
would mitigate differences in litigants’ views by including preseizure choices
and training.
B. Using Police Training and De-escalation to Evaluate Officers’
Preseizure Conduct
In recent years, U.S. police departments have tightened their rules on using
nondeadly and deadly force.384 Some authorize deadly force only as a last
resort.385 Many departments prohibit officers from shooting at moving
vehicles unless the vehicle is being used as a deadly weapon.386 Chicago
Police Department data show that changes in its use of force rules and
training that emphasized de-escalation and nonlethal alternatives reduced
officer-involved shootings from sixty-three in 2016 to forty-five in 2017.387
Many U.S. police departments have adopted more detailed use-of-force
policies and training beyond the constitutional minimum.388 More
departments are adopting policies emphasizing de-escalation measures, and
such policies in Canada effectively decreased civilian deaths by police.389
380. Complaint for Damages, Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, and Demand for Jury
Trial, supra note 2, at 7.
381. See id. at 8.
382. See Lam, supra note 1.
383. Complaint for Damages, Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, and Demand for Jury
Trial, supra note 2, at 7.
384. See McClellan, supra note 164, at 30–31.
385. See, e.g., General Order G03-02: Use of Force, CHI. POLICE DEP’T DIRECTIVES SYS.
3 (Feb. 29, 2020), http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-128ff3f0ae912-8fff-44306f3da7b28a19.pdf?hl=true [https://perma.cc/Z6Q5-W687]; General Order
5.01: Use of Force, S.F. POLICE DEP’T 11 (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.sanfranci
scopolice.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/DGO%205.01.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VEY-LQC9];
General Order 906.00—Dallas Police Department Use of Deadly Force Policy, DAL. POLICE
DEP’T, https://www.dallaspolice.net/reports/Shared%20Documents/General-Order-906.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U8GR-E92Q] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
386. Seattle Police Department Manual: 8.100—De-Escalation, SEATTLE.GOV (Sept. 15,
2019),
http://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-8---use-of-force/8100---de-escalation
[https://perma.cc/Z74X-XA79]; see also Model Use of Force Policy, CAMPAIGN ZERO,
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55ad38b1e4b0185f0285195f/t/5deffeb7e827c13873eaf
07c/1576009400070/Campaign+Zero+Model+Use+of+Force+Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/
389D-RW6W] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
387. See James, supra note 258.
388. POLICE EXEC. RSCH. F., GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE 36 (2016), https://
www.policeforum.org/assets/30%20guiding%20principles.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SW7NU3JH].
389. See, e.g., Policy 1115: Use of Force, BALT. POLICE DEP’T 6 (Nov. 24, 2019),
https://www.baltimorepolice.org/1115-use-force [https://perma.cc/8Z94-XQYJ] (identifying
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De-escalation is a central issue in use-of-force policies.390 One study found
many departments have adopted detailed de-escalation tactics to minimize
the need for force, some through Department of Justice (DOJ) 42 U.S.C.
§ 14141 consent decrees, which delineate effective policing tactics.391
Consent decrees are court-ordered agreements between DOJ and law
enforcement agencies after a DOJ investigation to correct long-standing
patterns of misconduct within police departments.392 Consequently, federal
courts’ standards for assessing reasonableness in excessive force claims
should include a focus on de-escalation. If officers significantly deviated
from department de-escalation procedures in their actions leading up to a
seizure, those choices should weigh more heavily toward unreasonableness.
This Note defines de-escalation as the same tactic defined by the 2017
National Consensus Policy on Use of Force, which defined de-escalation as
acting or communicating “to stabilize the situation and reduce the immediacy
of the threat so that more time, options, and resources can be called upon to
resolve the situation without the use of force or with a reduction in the force
necessary.” 393 The policy further stated that de-escalation may include the
use of certain techniques, such as “command presence, advisements,
warnings, verbal persuasion, and tactical repositioning.”394
Many of the policies adopted by police departments have been advocated
by groups such as Campaign Zero, which advocates more restrictive use-offorce policies to reduce injury or loss of life for both civilians and police.395
Campaign Zero has studied different police departments to see which policies
reduced the need for force.396 The study found that police departments with
de-escalation as a core principle and directing that “[m]embers shall, unless it is not possible
to do so, avoid the Use of Force by using De-Escalation Techniques”); NATIONAL CONSENSUS
POLICY ON USE OF FORCE 3 (2017), https://www.nccpsafety.org/assets/files/library/National_
Consensus_Policy_on_Use_of_Force.pdf [https://perma.cc/CL5S-QK37] (advocating that
officers “shall use de-escalation techniques and other alternatives . . . whenever possible and
appropriate before resorting to force and to reduce the need for force”).
390. See POLICE EXEC. RSCH. F., supra note 388, at 40; see also POLICE EXEC. RSCH. F.,
CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS OF LOCAL POLICE: LESSONS LEARNED 14 (2013), https://
www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/civil%20rights%20investigations%
20of%20local%20police%20-%20lessons%20learned%202013.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TLAB6D7].
391. See Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L.
REV. 211, 286–88 (2017).
392. See id. at 299–300. For more information regarding consent decrees resulting from
42 U.S.C. § 14141 and the U.S. attorney general’s power under § 14141 to reform local law
enforcement agencies engaged in misconduct or a pattern of unconstitutional behavior, see
generally Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189
(2014).
393. See NATIONAL CONSENSUS POLICY ON USE OF FORCE, supra note 389, at 2. The 2017
National Consensus Policy on Use of Force recommended policing policies that were drafted
by eleven of the most prominent law enforcement and labor organizations, such as the National
Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives and the International Association of
Chiefs of Police. Id.
394. Id.
395. See generally Model Use of Force Policy, supra note 386.
396. See DERAY MCKESSON ET AL., CAMPAIGN ZERO, POLICE USE OF FORCE POLICY
ANALYSIS 1 (2016), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56996151cbced68b170389f4/t/
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more restrictive policies killed fewer people and police were less likely to be
assaulted or killed in the line of duty.397 The most effective policies included
requiring comprehensive reporting and requiring officers to exhaust all other
alternatives before shooting, which decreased civilian deaths by 25
percent.398 Requiring de-escalation reduced killings by 15 percent, and
requiring a warning before shooting reduced deaths by 5 percent.399 Yet,
only thirty-four of the ninety-one police departments studied required deescalation techniques when possible before using force and thirty-one called
for officers to exhaust all other reasonable alternatives before utilizing
nondeadly or deadly force.400
Campaign Zero proposed a model use-of-force policy that recommends
training similar to Canada’s and the Seattle Police Department’s policy
highlighting tactics to gain a suspect’s submission through nonlethal
methods.401
The proposed procedures include:
de-escalation,
communication from safe positions, calming agitated subjects, calling
officers with nonlethal tools, and avoiding physical conflict unless
“immediately necessary” to prevent harm to officers and bystanders.402
In an article analyzing how to measure the totality of the circumstances of
police seizures of mentally disabled individuals, Professor Michael Avery
highlighted the importance of training in nonlethal tactics and concluded
courts should follow the Third Circuit’s approach to include officers’
preseizure choices that influenced the necessity of resorting to such force.403
Professor Avery recommended courts consider police training and
emphasized that effective training minimizes split-second decisionmaking.404 Similarly, the Court in Garner found it relevant to examine
department policies throughout the nation to consider the constitutionality of
using deadly force to stop fleeing felons.405
Recent state-law developments demonstrate the importance of a uniform
circuit approach that includes preseizure conduct and de-escalation in the
totality of the circumstances. Maryland House Bill 166, introduced in
January of 2020, would expand the time frame of the relevant circumstances
and allow fact finders to consider whether officers attempted to de-escalate

57e1b5cc2994ca4ac1d97700/1474409936835/Police+Use+of+Force+Report.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/YBP7-LKMH].
397. See id. at 9–10.
398. See id. at 8.
399. See id.
400. See id. at 4–6. An article assessing police department use-of-force policies in the
seventy-five largest cities in the United States found that de-escalation appeared in 52 percent
of policies and the use of de-escalation proactively limited excessive force. See Osagie K.
Obasogie & Zachary Newman, The Endogenous Fourth Amendment: An Empirical
Assessment of How Police Understandings of Excessive Force Become Constitutional Law,
104 CORNELL L. REV. 1281, 1301–08 (2019).
401. See Model Use of Force Policy, supra note 386, at 2.
402. Id.
403. See Avery, supra note 66, at 267.
404. See id. at 266–67.
405. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1985).
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the situation before using deadly force.406 The bill adds three factors fact
finders must consider as part of the totality of the circumstances: (1) whether
the suspect possessed or appeared to possess a deadly weapon and refused to
comply with officers’ orders reasonably related to public safety, such as to
drop the weapon; (2) whether officers used de-escalation measures, such as
using nonlethal alternatives, before using deadly force; and (3) whether
officers’ preseizure conduct increased the risk of subsequent use of deadly
force.407
Adding de-escalation to the totality of the circumstances expands the force
of law to department policies that already integrate de-escalation training.408
Including de-escalation as a factor in assessing reasonableness would
encourage officers to de-escalate a situation before using force, while still
recognizing that officers often make quick decisions in rapidly changing
situations that may not always be correct.409
The effectiveness of more stringent policies adopted by U.S. police
departments and Canadian police training with a focus on de-escalation
indicate that applying the Third Circuit’s framework, in which de-escalation
constitutes a significant factor, would provide a consistent and more
practicable method for evaluating the reasonableness of police conduct in
light of the totality of the circumstances. The totality of the circumstances
should include preseizure conduct and the availability of alternatives.
CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit’s causal approach and emphasis on de-escalation
provide tangible benefits. Through familiar causation analysis, courts may
analyze relevant interactions between officers and individuals before and at
the moment of seizure as part of the totality of the circumstances. A
causation framework that considers both parties’ relevant preseizure conduct,
with an emphasis on de-escalation, provides an objective rule for courts to
measure the reasonableness of officers’ force.
This framework would avoid favoring one party over another and would
decrease the disproportionate risk of the police’s use of force on young
people of color and people with mental disabilities. Adding whether officers
employed de-escalation measures as a factor does not create an overly
burdensome requirement, as illustrated by the Canadian courts’ approach.
Rather, it would guide judicial analysis in light of established policies and
procedures adopted by police departments throughout the United States.
Incorporating preseizure conduct and de-escalation truly evaluates the
totality of the circumstances to advance both officers’ and civilians’ safety.
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(statement of Cynthia Lee, Edward F. Howrey Professor of Law, George Washington
University Law School).
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